111 Microsoft CVEs Fixed This Month: The 7 Patches SMBs Must Prioritize
Busy teams don’t need a CVE wall—they need a short, safe patch plan. This month’s Microsoft release is big (100+ CVEs fixed). Below is a pragmatic 7‑patch shortlist for SMB environments, with why it matters, where it bites, and how to roll it out without breaking day‑to‑day work.
The 7 patches to prioritize
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Windows NTLM Elevation of Privilege (EoP)
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Why it matters: Lets a local attacker escalate to SYSTEM and pivot laterally. NTLM is still widely enabled in SMB networks.
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Affected surface: Domain‑joined Windows clients/servers with NTLM in use.
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Action: Patch all domain‑joined systems; audit and reduce NTLM usage. Monitor for unusual admin token use.
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Windows Kerberos (Auth bypass/privilege issues)
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Why it matters: Kerberos is the backbone of AD authentication. Weaknesses here enable domain escalation or SSO abuse.
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Affected surface: Domain controllers, Windows members using Kerberos tickets (every AD).
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Action: Patch DCs first; clear/renew tickets after maintenance. Review service account SPNs and constrained delegation.
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Windows SMB Remote Code Execution (RCE)
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Why it matters: Network‑exposed RCEs on SMB are worm‑bait and perfect for lateral movement.
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Affected surface: File servers, any host with SMB open to LAN/WAN.
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Action: Patch file servers early. Restrict SMB exposure to LAN only, segment by VLAN, block SMB over VPN/guest networks.
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Windows Message Queuing (MSMQ) RCE
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Why it matters: MSMQ is often installed and forgotten. RCE here gives initial footholds on servers.
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Affected surface: Servers with MSMQ role enabled (legacy apps, line‑of‑business services).
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Action: Identify MSMQ servers; patch and consider removing MSMQ where unused. Restrict access to app subnets only.
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Windows RRAS (Routing and Remote Access Service) issues
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Why it matters: Edge/VPN roles amplify risk. RRAS bugs can enable traversal or code execution.
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Affected surface: VPN/edge servers, branch connectivity.
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Action: Patch edge first. Confirm only required protocols/ports are enabled. Review VPN split‑tunnel and auth policies.
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Win32k/Graphics (Kernel/GUI) Elevation of Privilege
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Why it matters: Classic local EoPs used post‑phish to break out of user context to admin/SYSTEM.
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Affected surface: Workstations, RDS hosts, VDI pools, any user‑facing Windows.
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Action: Patch user devices quickly. Pair with browser/email hardening and EDR.
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Microsoft Office/SharePoint/Exchange fixes (tenant hygiene)
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Why it matters: Office client vulnerabilities are phish magnets; SharePoint/Exchange can be directly exploited in hybrid/on‑prem setups.
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Affected surface: Office on endpoints; any on‑prem/hybrid SharePoint/Exchange.
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Action: Update Office channels; patch on‑prem servers. Lock down external access, enforce modern auth, and review upload/attachment policies.
Fast rollout plan (SMB‑friendly)
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Day 0–1 (Core auth and edge)
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Patch DCs, ADFS, and edge/VPN/RRAS servers first.
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Patch SMB/MSMQ servers used by many users.
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Validate: Logon, GPO application, VPN connectivity, file shares.
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Day 2–3 (Servers and critical apps)
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Patch remaining servers (RDS, application, print).
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Validate: Line‑of‑business apps, printing, queue processing.
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Day 3–5 (Clients and Office)
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Push client updates and Office updates via WSUS/Intune.
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Validate: Browser, Office macros/add‑ins, printing.
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Post‑patch checks
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Clear/renew Kerberos tickets on key systems.
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Review event logs for auth, SMB, MSMQ errors.
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Run a quick SMB and MSMQ exposure scan on internal subnets.
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Quick verification checklist
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Domain Controllers: No KDC/Kerberos errors; logons and GPOs OK.
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File servers: Shares accessible; no SMB auth loops or signature errors.
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VPN/RRAS: Users connect; split‑tunnel/routes correct.
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MSMQ apps: Queues process; no backlog/timeouts.
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Office/SharePoint: Open/save works; add‑ins load; tenant access intact.
Risk reduction in parallel (15 minutes)
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Block SMB from guest/VPN segments; allow only to file servers.
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Disable/Remove MSMQ on servers where it’s not strictly needed.
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Enforce MFA on admin accounts; use just‑in‑time local admin where possible.
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Turn on ASR rules for Office/macros if licensing allows.
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Ensure EDR is in protect mode and tuned for token theft/LSASS tampering.
Common pitfalls to avoid
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Patching clients without domain controllers first (can cause auth weirdness).
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Ignoring MSMQ/older roles—these linger and become soft targets.
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Leaving SMB open across flat networks; segment or it becomes lateral‑movement express.
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Skipping reboots on kernel patches—vulnerable code stays resident.
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Not validating Line‑of‑Business workflows; patch windows need quick smoke tests.
Copy‑friendly internal comms (send to staff)
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“We’re installing critical Windows updates this week. Save work and leave devices powered on. If a reboot prompt appears, please restart the same day. If VPN or file shares misbehave after patching, contact IT.”
FAQs
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Q1: Why patch DCs first?
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Authentication flaws can cascade through the domain. Fixing DCs stabilizes auth for everything else.
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Q2: Can we defer MSMQ if apps are critical?
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If you can’t patch immediately, restrict MSMQ exposure to only the app subnets and schedule an emergency window.
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Q3: Users report printer glitches after updates—what now?
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Re‑deploy print drivers and check print spooler updates. Consider disabling legacy protocols temporarily.
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Q4: Will this break NTLM‑dependent apps?
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Patching should not, but tightening NTLM later might. Inventory NTLM uses now to plan deprecation.
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Q5: How to prove coverage to management?
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Export a post‑patch compliance report from WSUS/Intune/your RMM and attach key event log screenshots (DCs/VPN/file servers).
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